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ABSTRACT
In this paper we consider the e¤ect of union structure on the adoption of innovation
in the context of Cournot duopoly. With a market size large enough we show that the
incentive to innovate is higher under a decentralized union structure (with each …rm
facing its own independent union) than under an industry-wide union. However, for
a small market size (or, equivalently, for su¢ciently drastic potential innovation) the
new technology is more likely to be adopted in the presence of a centralized union.
This result goes against the conventional view that unionization harms the incentive
to innovate.
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21. Introduction.
The interaction between oligopolistic product markets and unionized labor markets
has been studied in the recent literature from di¤erent perspectives (e.g., Davidson,
1988; Dobson, 1994; Dowrick, 1989, 1993). Those contributions emphasize the role of
the wage bargaining structure on labor and product market outcomes.
This paper deals with the interactions between di¤erent union-…rm bargaining
structures and innovation under oligopoly. Di¤erent aspects of this issue have been
recently addressed by some authors.1 We focus on the e¤ect of the degree of union
centralization on the …rms incentives to adopt innovation. Speci…cally we consider
a Cournot duopoly where innovation and wages are determined endogenously. We
compare the outcomes of two alternative settings. In the …rst case, it is assumed a
model with an independent union in each …rm. In this model, every …rm decides,
simultaneously, to adopt or not an innovation, then each union and its …rm bargain
the wage of their workers and, …nally, …rms compete in quantities à la Cournot. In
the second case, we assume a model where, instead of independent unions, there is a
single industry-wide union which bargains the wages with both …rms.
Our model is similar in spirit to Tauman and Weiss (1987), who consider the
incentives for innovation by a unionized duopolistic …rm when its competitor is not
unionized. However they assume that only one …rm is unionized, while in our case
both …rms are unionized. In another similar approach, Ulph and Ulph (1994) analyze
1See Ulph and Ulph (1998) for a general discussion on the role of R&D as a strategic tool in
oligopolistic unionized markets. Also Dowrick and Spencer (1994) have investigated the unions
attitude towards innovation under oligopoly.
3a duopolistic model where both …rms are unionized and compete in the product
market and in a patent race to obtain a new technology. In their work only one …rm
can innovate (the winner of the patent race), while in our setting both …rms have
the choice of adopting the new technology. Another important di¤erence with Ulph
and Ulph (1994) is that those authors only consider the case of a decentralized union
structure (that is, each …rm faces a single union), while we compare both possibilities.
Freeman and Medo¤ (1984, pp. 170-71) have pointed out the ambiguity of union-
ization on the incentive to invest in a new technology. On the one hand, a higher wage
associated with a greater union power increases the …rms incentives for adopting a
new technique using less labor (the ”labor-saving” e¤ect). On the other hand, the po-
tential returns of investing in innovation are reduced due to the higher rents captured
by the union in the bargaining process, which decreases the incentives to innovate
(the ”rent-seeking” e¤ect). We characterize which of these two e¤ects is dominant,
depending on the degree of potential innovation. For this purpose, we will interpret
the move from a decentralized to a centralized union structure as an increase in the
level of unionization.
Our main …ndings are the following:
1) For a small market size (or, equivalently, a very drastic potential innovation) a
centralized union structure favors the adoption of innovation, relative to the decen-
tralized setup.
2) For high levels of market size, a centralized union makes innovation more di¢-
cult than a decentralized union structure.
Intuitively, for any given market size the innovation is …rstly adopted by just one
4…rm as the innovation cost decreases su¢ciently, but in the case of a small market
size only the innovator will be active. However, the incentive to become an innovator
monopolist is greater in the centralized model than in the decentralized model since
duopolist pro…ts are smaller in the centralized model than in the decentralized setting.
In other words: the ”labor-saving” e¤ect of increased unionization prevails in this
case. Nevertheless, if market size is large then both …rms are still active when the
innovation is …rstly introduced and, consequently, the previous argument does not
hold. In this case our result agrees with the usual (and conventional) view that
increased unionization harms the incentive to innovate due to the prevailing ”rent-
seeking” e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the model
with a centralized or industry-wide union, in Section 3 we develope the model with
two independent or decentralized unions. In Section 4 we undertake the compara-
tive analysis of the outcomes in the previous models. Finally, Section 5 gathers our
conclusions.
2. The model with a decentralized union structure.
Let us consider a duopoly where …rms produce a homogeneous product with a linear
demand function. We will consider two di¤erent cases. Firstly, in this section, we
analyze a situation where there is a union per …rm, each one maximizing the utility
of its …rm’s workers and, secondly, a situation in which there is only an industry-wide
union which maximizes the total utility of the workers in the industry.
We will refer to the …rst situation as the ”decentralized” union model and the
5second one as the ”centralized” union model.
We will establish the following speci…c assumptions:
The inverse demand function in the product market is p = a ¡ (x1 + x2)( a>0);
where p is the price and xi (i =1 ;2) is the output of the ith …rm.
Each …rm i has the cost function:
Ci = wi ¢ ki ¢ xi + ´i;
where wi is the wage paid for …rm i; ki is the labor requirement per unit of output for
…rm i and ´i is a …xed cost: Then the employment by …rm i is given by Li = ki ¢ xi:
In our model, ki and ´i are constant parameters which will be determined by a
technological decision of …rm i.
In our model, if …rm i decides not to innovate, then ki =1and ´i =0 : On the
other hand, the possibility for innovation is modelized in the following way: if …rm
i chooses a new technology, then ki = e<1 and ´i = ">0; where " is assumed to
be a sunk cost, which can be interpreted as the …xed investment necessary to obtain
the new technology (e.g. R&D investment), and (1 ¡ e) is the reduction in the labor
requirement per unit of output, as a result of choosing the new technology. In other
words: we consider only labor-saving innovations.
We will de…ne the utility function of the union in …rm i as Vi =( wi¡r)¢Li; where r
is the reservation wage, which can be interpreted as the wage earned in the competitive
sector. That is, each union aim is to maximize the total amount of rent, namely the
remuneration in excess of the reservation wage in each …rm. This assumption is
standard in the literature of unionized oligopolistic industries, see for example De
6Fraja (1993). For a more general speci…cation of the unions utility functions, see
Dowrick and Spencer (1994) in their analysis of the relationship between innovation
and unions.
Each …rm, say i; is assumed to maximize its pro…ts, given by ¦i = p ¢ xi ¡ Ci:
We assume a wage-setting mechanism known in the literature as the ”right-to-
manage” model, in which the …rm and the union bargain over the wage while the
employment is set unilaterally by the …rm. The solution concept in this model is the
Nash bargaining solution, obtained by maximizing the following function with respect
to wi:
Zi(wi)=( Vi(wi) ¡ V )¯(¦i(wi) ¡ ¦)1¡¯:
Where V and ¦ are the fall-back positions of the union and the …rm, respectively, and
¯ is the union’s bargaining power. A particular example arises when all the bargaining
power corresponds to the union, that is ¯ =1 ;which is known as the ”monopoly
union” model, following the terminology by Oswald (1985). We will assume symmetric
bargaining powers, that is ¯ = 1
2; and that the fall-back positions of both bargainers
are zero.
The time structure of the game is as follows:
Stage 1. Each …rm decides simultaneously its technology, the new one or the old
one.
Stage 2. Each union bargains simultaneously with its …rm on the wage corre-
sponding to its workers.
Stage 3. Each …rm decides simultaneously its output and employment.
7In the analysis of the model we will use backwards induction in order to …nd out
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the above game.
Let us …rst consider the case where both …rms are active at the third stage. As we
will show below this will happen if the degree of innovation (1 ¡ e) is small enough,
relative to market size, measured by a.
Standard computations show that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output, employ-
ment and pro…ts levels in stage 3 are:
xi =
a ¡ 2kiwi + kjwj
3
i;j =1 ;2 i 6= j (2.1)
Li = ki ¢
µ





(a ¡ 2kiwi + kjwj)2
9
: (2.3)
Thus, the objective function of union i a ts t a g e2c a nb ew r i t t e na s
Vi =( wi ¡ r) ¢
µ








3a +1 6 rki +2 kjr
ki
;i ; j=1 ;2;i 6= j:
Depending on the previous technological choices by the …rms, in Stage 1, the above
results yield the following pro…ts:
Case i) Both …rms choose not to innovate (i.e: ki = kj =1and ´i =0 ) :
8¦i =¦ j =
4(a ¡ r)2
49
Case ii) Both …rms choose to innovate (i.e: ki = kj = e<1; and ´i = "):




Case iii) One …rm (say i) decides to innovate and the other (say j) chooses not to
innovate (i.e, ki = e<1;´ i = "; kj =1and ´j =0 ):
¦i =
4(3a +2 r ¡ 5re)2
441
¡ "; ¦j =
4(3a +2 re¡ 5r)2
441
To solve for the SPE of the decentralized union game, let us consider the following
payo¤ matrix for the …rms, at the …rst stage, obtained from the previous analysis of
stages 2 and 3. In this matrix, New stands for the decision of choosing the new tech-
nology and Old stands for the decision of not innovating. Without loss of generality
let us assume r =1and de…ne ° =1¡ e and ® = a ¡ 1: Recall that (1 ¡ e) is the
reduction in the labor requirement per unit of output, as a result of choosing the new
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9From the above matrix, it follows that there might be three di¤erent types of SPE
depending on the parameters of the model:
First, if 4
49®2 > 4
441(3®+5°)2¡" then choosing the old technology is the dominant
strategy and thus SPE implies both …rms choosing Old. Let us denote this particular
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Finally, by a similar argument, if D1(®;°) <"<D 2(®;°); then there are two
SPE, where only one …rm innovate: (New; Old),a n d(Old; New):
The previous results are valid if ® ¸ 2
3°: In this case both …rms are always active.
However if the market size (measured by ®) is small enough relative to the degree
of innovation (measured by °) then in the asymmetric choices (New; Old) and (Old;
New) only the innovator is active. This happens in the case ®<2
3°; where the
production of the …rm choosing the old technology is zero if the other …rm innovates.
Standard computations yield the following matrix of pro…ts, taking into account that
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Now, (Old;Old) is the SPE if 4
49®2 > 9











And (New;New) is the SPE if 4











A similar argument shows that if D2(®;°) <"<D 1(®;°) there are two SPE:
(New;Old) and (Old;New).
The Figure 1 illustrates the previous result in the (®;") space, considering ° as
given. The region above D1(®;°) corresponds with set of values for ® and " such that
the SPE is given by (Old, Old), that is, both …rms decide not to innovate. In the
region below D2(®;°) both …rms innovate and in the region between D1(®;°) and
D2(®;°) the SPE are (New, Old) and (Old, New) that is, only one …rm innovates.
(I n s e r tF i g u r e1 )
The previous analysis, is summarized in the following
Proposition 1. In the decentralized union game, the following properties hold:
i) If " ¸ D1(®;°); then, at the SPE both …rms decide not to innovate.
11ii) If D1(®;°) <"<D 2(®;°); then there are two SPE, with only one …rm inno-
vating. Moreover, if ® · 2
3° only the innovator is active at each SPE.




























According to Proposition 1, for any market size ®; t h el o w e rt h ec o s to fi n n o v a t i o n
" the more likely is that the new technology is chosen. In terms of Figure 1, as we
decrease " (given ®); the new technology is initially chosen by just one …rm (that is
when D1 is reached). In the case of small market size (®<2
3°) the …rst innovator
becomes, initially, a monopolist, while with large market sizes (® ¸ 2
3°)t h i s… r mi s
still a duopolist. Finally, if " is small enough (that is when D2 is reached) both …rms
will adopt the new technology.
3. The model with a centralized union structure.
In this section , we will analyze the case in which there is a unique industry-wide
union which bargains the wages for both …rms in order to maximize the following
objective function:
V = V1 + V2 =( w1 ¡ r) ¢ L1 +( w2 ¡ r) ¢ L2.
The time structure of the game is as follows:
12Stage 1. Each …rm decides simultaneously its technology, the new one or the old
one.
Stage 2. The single union bargains with both …rms the wages corresponding to
the workers of each …rm.
Stage 3. Each …rm decides simultaneously its output and employment.
Thus, in our model it is assumed that the industry-wide union bargains on wages
simultaneously with both …rms.2
When computing the Nash solution of the bargaining problem, we will assume
that the status quo payo¤ of the union is given by the payo¤ that it would obtain
in the bargaining with the other …rm as a monopolist. Standard computations show
that this status quo payo¤ is V m
i = 3
32(a ¡ kjr)2:
By an argument analogous to the one used in the previous section, we compute






;i=1 ;2;i 6= j:
Depending on the previous technological choices by the …rms, in stage 1, the above
results yield the following pro…ts:
Case i) Both …rms choose not to innovate (i.e: ki = kj =1and ´i =0 ) :




Case ii) Both …rms choose to innovate (i.e: ki = kj = e<1; and ´i = "):
2See Dobson (1994) and De Fraja (1993) for union models in which sequential bargaining is also
considered.




Case iii) One …rm (say i) decides to innovate and the other (say j) chooses not to
innovate (i.e, ki = e<1;´ i = "; kj =1and ´j =0 ):
¦i =
(a ¡ 2er + r)2
16
¡ "; ¦j =
(a ¡ 2r + er)2
16
:
To solve for the SPE of the decentralized union game, let us consider the following
payo¤ matrix for the …rms, at the …rst stage, obtained from the previous analysis of
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From the above matrix, it follows that there might be three di¤erent types of SPE
depending on the parameters of the model:
First, (Old;Old) is the SPE if ®2
16 ¸
(a+2°)2








Second, (New;New) is the SPE if
(®+°)2







14A similar argument shows that if C2(®;°) <"<C 1(®;°) there are two SPE:
(New, Old) and (Old, New):
In the case ®<° ;the production of the …rm choosing the old technology is zero if
the other …rm innovates. Standard computations yield the following matrix of pro…ts,
taking into account that if choices are (New, Old) or (Old, New) the union bargains
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Now, (Old, Old) is the SPE if 1
16®2 ¸ 9











And (New, New) is the SPE if 1











A similar argument shows that if C2(®;°) <"<C 1(®;°) there are two SPE:
(New, Old) and (Old, New).
The Figure 2 illustrates the previous result in the (®;") space, considering ° as
given. The region above C1(®;°) corresponds with set of values for ® and " such that
the SPE is given by (Old; Old); that is, both …rms decide not to innovate. In the
region below C2(®;°) both …rms innovate and in the region between C1(®;°) and
C2(®;°) the SPE are (New, Old) and (Old, New), that is, only one …rm innovates.
15(I n s e r tF i g u r e2 )
The previous analysis, is summarized in the following
Proposition 2. In the centralized union game, the following properties hold:
i) If " ¸ C1(®;°); then, at the SPE both …rms decide not to innovate.
ii) If C1(®;°) <"<C 2(®;°); then there are two SPE, with only one …rm inno-
vating. Moreover, if ® · ° only the innovator is active at each SPE.






















16°2 if ®<° :
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is analogous to Proposition 1, and is re‡ected
in Figure 2. Note, however, that the upper-bound of the levels of ® consistent with the
presence of an innovator monopolist is now greater than in the decentralized model.
The intuition behind this result relies on the fact that under a centralized union wages
are higher than in the decentralized model, which involves that the required market
size to allow competition between the innovator and the non-innovator is greater.
164. Comparing outcomes under di¤erent union structures.
In this section we will focus on the comparative e¤ects of union structure on techno-
logical innovation.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we get the following result:
Corollary 1. Assume that " (the cost of adopting the new technology) is decreasing
in time. Then the following properties hold relative to the SPE in the centralized and
decentralized union games:
i) If ® · 2
3°; the innovation is introduced in the centralized model before it is in
the decentralized one. In both models the innovation is initially introduced by a …rm
that becomes a monopolist. (See …gure 3.i)
ii) If 2
3°<®<° ;the innovation is introduced in the decentralized (resp. central-
ized) model before it is in the centralized (resp. decentralized) model for small (resp.
large) values of ®: Only in the centralized case the innovator becomes a monopolist.
(See …gure 3.ii)
iii) If ® ¸ °; the innovation is introduced in the decentralized (resp. centralized)
model before it is in the centralized (resp. decentralized) model for large (resp. small)
values of ®: Both …rms are always active in each model. (See …gure 3.iii)
The previous result is illustrated in Figures 3i, 3ii and 3iii in the (®; ") space.
Insert Figures 3i, 3ii, 3iii
I nt h ec a s eo fp a r ti )o ft h eC o r o l l a r y ,a s" decreases the innovation is adopted
in the centralized model before than in the decentralized one (note that C1 >D 1
17in this case). Therefore, one interesting implication of the previous corollary is that
the centralized union structure enhances the adoption of innovation relative to the
decentralized union structure, in the presence of small market sizes (that is, when
®<2
3° ). To explain this result, note, …rst, that with this market sizes both models
involve that if only one …rm innovates then it becomes a monopolist. Therefore, the
pro…ts of a monopolist innovator are the same in both models, while the pro…ts of
each …rm in a duopoly with no innovation are smaller in the case of a centralized
model, which implies that the incentives to innovate are greater in this latter model.
With high enough market sizes (part iii of the corollary) the innovation is …rst
introduced in the decentralized model, while for intermediate market sizes there is a
subinterval with the same property as in part i).
Comparing our model and results with those in the work by Ulph and Ulph (1994)
where they develop a model of patent race, some interesting similarities and di¤erences
are worth to be noted. First, in their model, if unions negotiate on both wages and
employment there are cases in which bargaining with a stronger union will help a …rm
to win the patent race. In our model the more centralized is the union structure, the
more likely is that the innovation is adopted by at least one …rm, if market size is
small enough. In other words, their model establishes that, in some cases, a stronger
bargaining power by an independent union stimulates innovation at the …rm level,
while in our model a stronger union structure in the industry as a whole yields higher
incentives to innovate, but at the industry level. Moreover, in our framework the
fact that, in some cases, only one …rm innovates is an endogenous outcome of the
model, while in their model that is an assumption associated with their modelling of
18innovation as a patent race in which only one …rm can get the new technology. In
fact, in our model the technology is adopted, in some cases by both …rms.
However, note …rst that from our previous results it is easy to check that workers
utility in each …rm will always be higher with a single industry-wide union than with
independent unions. This result is rather intuitive and is similar to those obtained
by Dowrick (1993) in a model where this author compares the di¤erent outcomes
associated with di¤erent levels of centralization in union structures. However in his
model there is no innovation, thus a …rst consequence from our model is that it allows
to extend some previous results by Dowrick (1993) for the case in which endogenous
innovation is allowed.
5. Conclusions.
In this paper we have investigated the in‡uence of the organizational aspects of the
unions on the …rms decisions about innovation, in the context of duopolistic Cournot
competition. We identify the conditions under which the incentive to innovate in-
creases in the presence of a centralized industry-wide union, relative to the case of
decentralized or independent unions.
Our results have some connections with some previous literature. In particular,
our model is related with the one developed by Tauman and Weiss (1987), who analyze
the incentive to adopt a new technology by a unionized duopolistic …rm competing
with a non-unionized …rm. They show that the unionized …rm might have a higher
incentive to adopt the new technology than the non-unionized …rm. However, this
result only holds if the unionized …rm has initially higher marginal production cost
19than its competitor. In contrast, we show that an increased unionization (re‡ected
in a higher level of union centralization) can stimulate innovation even if both …rms
have the same initial technology.
Our paper is also related with the model by Ulph and Ulph (1994), which basic
insight is that the innovation depends crucially on the form in which each …rm bargains
(on wages or/and employment) with its own union. In our model we focus, instead,
on the form in which unions are organized. We show that if innovation is su¢ciently
drastic then an industry-wide or centralized union enhances the incentive to innovate
relative to the case in which there are independent unions (See Corollary 1).
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